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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
14589

-vsROY H. HEL11,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Roy H. Helm, appeals from a
judgment entered against him in the Second Judicial District
of Utah, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan presiding, following
a conviction for tampering with evidence.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on Harch 26,
1976, of tampering with evidence in violation of Utah Code
Ann.

§

76-8-510

(1953), and sentenced April 19, 1976.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The respondent seeks an order of this Court
affirming the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of
facts as submitted by Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE DID PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF
ITS CASE AND THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL.
In order to satisfy its burden of proof,
the State must present sufficient evidence to
establish each element of the crime charged.

Proper

reading of the applicable statutes and careful
examination of the testimony presented at trial
necessitate the conclusion that the State carried
its burden in the present case.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1973), reads
in part:
"A person commits a felony
of the second degree if, believing
that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about
to be instituted, he:
(1)
Alters, destroys, conceals or removes anything with a
purpose to impair its verity or
availability in the proceeding or
investigation."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-2Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The first requirement for a person to be
guilty of this crime is that he believes an official
proceeding or investigation pending or about to be
instituted.
Appellant's argument in regards to this
requirement interprets the wording too compartmentally.
The point at which an investigation ends and an official
proceeding begins is not always clear and definite.
The line appellant wants to draw between the two is not
always present.
App2lla~t's

argument also seems to ignore some

basic facts of this present case.

It is clear from the

testimony of both Trooper Busch and Sergeant Hatch that
Mr. Eccles had been arrested for driving under the influence
of alcoholic beverages by Trooper Busch and that he had
been taken to the Farmington Sheriff's Office for the
purpose of being booked into the jail for this offense.
Appellant was completely apprised of this situation by
the time he arrived at Farmer's State Bank.
It is obvious that appellant, a Colonel in the
Highway Patrol, knew that an official judicial proceeding

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-3Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

against Mr. Eccles would soon be instituted to adjudicate
this charge.

Appellant also knew that the evidence

gathered by Trooper Busch would be essential for the
purpose of the State proving its case in such a proceeding.
The narrow interpretation of the statute advocato
by appellant is so restrictive that the purpose and intew.
of the statute would be defeated.
The second element of this crime, concealing m
removing the materials, was satisfied when appellant retai:·
the evidence which Trooper Busch had assembled.
caused this evidence to be removed
therefore removed

Appellant

from the trooper

a~

it from the normal, procedural course

it would have followed had appellant not intervened.

The

retension of this evidence is concealment due to the mere
fact it rightly should have been returned to the trooper
or turned in to be properly dealt with and filed.
[I]ntent may be
inferred from conduct of a
defendant and from circumstantial
evidence upon which reasonable
inferences may be based."
Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68
(Wyo. 1972); Stuebgen v. State,
548 P.2d 870 (\~yo. 1976);
People v. Braly, 532 P.2d 325
(Colo. 1975).
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Appellant questioned Trooper Busch as to
whether or not anyone had seen Mr. Eccles being brought
into the station; he recognized that proceedings were
inevitable against Mr. Eccles unless he intercepted the
damaring evidence; he reiterated, several times, that
Mr. Eccles was a powerful person who could harm the
Highway Patrol; he took control of the evidence that
night and never returned it to the investigating
officer.
All these facts lead to the reasonable inference
that appellant re;noved and concealed this

e':ic'.'.<:c~"

Eor

the purpose of impairing its availability at any future
proceeding which would be instituted against Mr. Eccles
in regards to this drunk driving charge.

The motive for

such action was to insure that Mr. Eccles would not
retaliate against the Highway Patrol or individual
officers.

Although this intent was not obvious at the

time appellant asked for and took the evidence, such
intent is obvious when one views the totality of
appellant's actions in regards to this evidence.
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POINT II
TESTIMONY GIVEN BY STATE'S \HTNESSES D
NOT REQUIRE CORROBORATION AND THE COURT PROPERLY
DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18

(1953) , states

in part:
"A conviction shall not be
had on the testimony of an
accomplice, unless he is corroborated
by other evidence, which in itself
tends to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense.
Apparently it is appellant's argument that
there was a conspiracy among appellant and State's
witnesses and therefore the State's witnesses were
accomplices of appellant.

Both the basis and conclu-

sian of this argument are fallacious.
Conspiracy is a specific intent crime.
was nothing said or done by appellant or State's

There
wit~s~

which implied that any of them had the intent to make an
agreement to conceal or remove the evidence.

The troope:

had no idea that appellant \vOuld consequently do just t~:
Wi·~:hout this intent, without an agreement, there coulc :,

no conspiracy.
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The more relevant conclusion, however, is
that State's witnesses were not accomplices of the
appellant.
This Court has had several opportunities
to define the meaning of "accomplice."
"In this State we have no
statutory definition of accomplice,
but the court has construed the
word to refer to one who is or
co~ld be charged as a principle
with defendant on trial." State
v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 Pac.
203 (1929); State v. Fertig, 233
P.2d 347 (1951); State v. Kasai,
27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265
( 197 2) .
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-202 (1973), spells

out who can be guilty as a principle:
"Every person, acting with
the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who
solicits,requests, commands,
encourages or intentionally aids
another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct."
Again, the all important intent is
lacking.

These two troopers had no knowledge or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intent that the evidence would be kept and concealed
by appellant, and, in fact, subsequently signed a
complaint against Mr. Eccles on this charge (T.28).
Although it was logical for the troopers to assume
that appellant was going to give Mr. Eccles

speci~l

treatment in this matter, it did not follow that h-"
would break the law in doing so.

They are guilty

only of following orders--orders which were not
patently criminal or wrongful.

It is quite common

and totally acceptable for an officer to permit
a senior

office~

to intervene in

particularl~·

sensitive situations.
Since the State's witnesses lacked the
necessary intent to be charged as a principle,
they are not accomplices and their testimony is
more than sufficient to sustain this conviction.
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POHJT III
THE LO\':SR COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO
SENT£;;:::£ THE APPELLl,:JT.

Utah law requires that:
"[A]fter a verdict of
guilty if judgYl.ent is not
arrested.
. the Court must
appoin~ a time for pronouncing
judgment, which must be at least
two days and not more than ten
days after the verdict."
Utah Cede Ann. § 77-35-l (1953,
as amended) .
This statute presents the problem of determining whether
the \lord "must" is mandatory or directory only.

An

analysis of cases through the years establishes the process

be rncle.
In an early case the United States Supreme
Cour~
tha~

The

discusse:l the P.:eaning of "shall 11 within a statute

said every probationer shall be given a hearing.
Ccur~

first considered the words alone and then

"':"he ce'•:·n:lc.nt shCill be dealt
•.·ithin a stated -..:ay; it is languuge
c~ co~--~~d. u test of significance,
th'l: :h l'r:lt contcollinq.
. Doubt,
hr_.~·.·c·.

:-. .-

fr(,:---,

\.'G!::::

€:

r. -~

~

2 r.

.. - - -

i~:

d

i=->r~'•-=llcd

,-tlu;;r~

l air:-::; . ,
L'J S C. S .

v1hen \·Jc pass
to a v ir::!\·1 of the
Escoe v. Zerb~~t.
4 ':J () ( l 'J l:,)
-
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The Court concluded that the purpose of the

statut~

was to protect the defendant from malicious, ungrounded
charges and therefore "shall" was seen as command language,
In State v. Nelson, 200 Kan. 411, 436

P.2d

885 (1968), the Kansas Supreme Court applied this sa.ne
test to determine the meaning of a statute, similar
to the one in question, which said "if motion for new
trial is overruled, sentence shall be imposed within
five days.

They reasoned that:
[w]hen the legislature
prescribes a time when an official
act is to be performed, the broad
legislative purpose is to be considered by the courts whenever they
are called upon to decide whether
·time prs.scribeG by statute is Fland.::---J.to;:-y

or directory."

Id. 887.

In viewing tfie statute they concluded the purpose was
to

"prev~Gt

prolonged, unreasonable delay in the

sentencing of the defendant" and since the delay was
not unreasonable, even though more than five days had
elapsed, the court still had jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit concurred with this process
when it stated:
. The interpretation of these
words [shall and may) depends upon
the background circumstances and context in which they are used and the
intention of the legislative body or
administrative agen~y which used
them." United States v. Fceb, 433 I'.
2d 381, 383 (Ninth Circuit 1970).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Even in the case of Anderson v. Yungkau,
3 2 9 U . S . 4 8 2 , 6 7 S . Ct . 4 2 8 , 91 L. Ed . 4 3 6 ( 19 4 6) ,
which the appellant cites for proposition that "shall"
was a word of command and not aC::visory, the Court
buoyed their definition by concluding that " . .
[r)easons of policy support this construction."

Id.

486.

A singular look at the words of the statute in
question would suggest that it is a mandatory time
limit.

However, it is important to take a further

step and determine the legislative purpose for this
statute.
mdnJJte

The purpose of the minimum limit is to
ci~e

for

c~G

judge to review

t~e

c~se

ar1d

defendant and determine an appropriate sentence.

~he

The

purpose of the maximum limit is to assure that the
defendant will not be unreasonably detained without
any sentence.

The reason for the delay in imposing

the sentence in the present case was that the judge
had not received a report from the Adult Probation
Department.

Without this report the judge could not

make an intelligent assessment of the appellant and
therefore could not impose a well determined sentence.
The delay was for the benefit of the appellant in that
it assured a fairer sentence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This was especially true in this case because the appellant had not offered any evidence

in his defense nor had he given his account of
the situation.

Without the report the judge had

absolutely nothing by which to evaluate the appellant.
Even the appellant's counsel recognized the importance
of having available additional information at time
of sentencing when he asked that the results of
a polygraph test be made part of the file and taken
into account when the judge decide] on the sentence.
(T. 94).

When dealing with the meaning of this

"This court has held that the
tim2 fixed by the statute is not
J~ri~~ictional.
. and since it
~~ resarded as merely directory
the further provision that the
judJment should be rendered within
a reasonable time has been read
into the statute." State v. Fedder,
262 P.2d 753, 755 (1953).
In
accord State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d
456, 519 P.2d 1340 (1974).

Considering the acceptable excuse for the
delay it must be concluded that sentence was rendered

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

within a reasonable time and the court had jurisdiction
to do so.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, respondent respectfully
requests that the judgment of the lower court be
aff irmeC.::.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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